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Abstract  
The desire to structure the remuneration of top banking executives and other material 
risk takers (MRTs), particularly the elements that are risk sensitive and aligned with 
long–term incentives of their institutions, is at the centre of the regulatory debate. This 
discussion is part of the wider debate on the creation of cross–country banking 
regulation that is aimed at reducing systemic risk in the banking industry whilst 
maintaining its competitive and innovative elements. Following the introduction of the 
Capital Requirements Directives (CRD) III and IV the academic literature has shed 
some light on the benefits and costs of restrictions on variable pay, malus and 
clawbacks, and group behaviour of MRTs. Yet, we are still far from understanding the 
real costs and benefits of these reforms and the forthcoming CRD V, and how these 
will support the demands of fintech transformation of the banking industry and the need 
to promote sustainable finance.  
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1. Introduction 
Immediately following the financial crisis, the remuneration of top executives at banks 
and other systemically important financial institutions attracted a lot of attention. At that time, 
the scale and structure of remuneration was commonly perceived as one of the main causes of 
excessive risk taking by banks and one of the causes of the financial crisis. In addition, the 
level of remuneration was considered to be a symbol of extreme greed and recklessness. There 
are many reasons why the interest in bankers’ remuneration has not subsided in the period since 
the financial crisis.  
First, the financial crisis has left a long–lasting mark on world economic development 
and stability. This has raised awareness amongst academics, policy makers and the general 
public of the potential consequences of inappropriate remuneration incentives.   
Second, the spate of banking reforms (including new remuneration regulation) have 
created an imperative to better understand their effectiveness in curbing risk taking, reducing 
systemic risk and stabilising the banking industry. In particular, it is not clear what the effects 
of individual policies are; do they complement each other, substitute each other, or undo each 
other.  
Third, despite the restrictions that have been placed on the components of remuneration, 
the level of total remuneration in banks has remained high. According to Reuters, in 2015 four 
of the biggest European banks (HSBC, Deutsche Bank, Standard Chartered and Barclays) alone 
had 1,740 material risk takers (MRTs) earning compensation packages in excess of €1 million.2 
According to the European Banking Authority (EBA, 2019a), in the same year across the EU, 
the number of bankers on compensation packages of €1 million or higher hit 5,142. In the UK 
 
2 https://www.marketscreener.com/BARCLAYS-PLC-9583556/news/Number-of-newly-minted-millionaires-at-
Europe-s-big-banks-is-shrinking-24101817/  
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alone, there were 3,567 bankers earning more than €1m, and together their remuneration 
amounted to €10bn. (EBA, 2019a).  
Fourth, the rapid development and implementation of technological innovation, 
‘fintech’, married with insufficient regulation of fintech products, services and, indeed, of this 
whole new branch of the financial industry, has created an urgent need to expand our 
knowledge of the specifics of fintech and its adoption by the sector. The current regulation of 
fintech markets and entities is not well designed to mitigate the risks that may emerge from the 
adoption of fintech, hence is not necessarily aligned with maintaining appropriate executive 
incentives. Moreover, since greater competition and greater adoption of fintech make existing 
regulation (e.g. capital requirements) less effective, the role of remuneration structures can play 
in restricting risk taking may become more important.   Finally, climate change imposes new 
challenges throughout the financial industry, including banks. It is not clear how sustainability, 
environmental, social and governance (ESG) issues have been adopted by banks and whether 
there are linkages between remuneration and the adoption of sustainable policies and strategies.  
Some of the issues listed above have already been debated in the finance literature, but 
others have not. This review builds up on Zalewska (2016) and assesses the current state of the 
academic research that has developed in response to the regulatory changes in remuneration 
policies and practices following the introduction of the Basel II and Capital Requirement 
Directive (CRD) III. It also discusses some important gaps in the literature that have emerged 
in the light of regulatory and market changes.  
  
2. Regulatory developments 
 Prior to the 2008 financial crisis bankers’ remuneration was commonly perceived as 
part of internal policies of banks and was only subject to the general rules of good corporate 
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governance practices.3 In the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, the remuneration practices 
of banks became the subject of increasing regulatory attention and led to efforts aimed at 
structuring remuneration in a way that would curb excessive risk taking, and prevent the  
practice of reward without performance. In addition, given the high interconnectivity of banks, 
the policies taken within the EU aimed to synchronise remuneration practices across banks and 
countries.  This swing from ‘governing’ to ‘designing’ remuneration has led to numerous 
regulatory rules and directives. These reached far into the standard domain of executive boards 
and remuneration committees, reducing their freedom to align the remuneration of executives 
with shareholder preferences. At the same time, shareholders have been given more voice and 
are required to vote on remuneration packages of executives at least every three years.  
Furthermore, regulatory intervention has not stopped at the executive level. The remuneration 
rules and directives have been designed to apply to all “categories of staff whose professional 
activities have a material impact on their risk profile, remuneration policies and practices that 
are consistent with effective risk management”4, i.e. MRTs. Thus, the issue of designing 
remuneration has been significantly widened from a relatively small group of executives and 
boards to a much larger group that may never have attended a single board meeting and/or 
participated in any bank–wide strategic decision–making. In 2018, Deutsche Bank reported 
that their MRT group consisted of 45 management board members and of 1,868 other MRTs.5 
The same year, BNP Paribas reported that they had just two executive corporate officers and 
1,429 other MRTs.6  
 
3 For instance, according to UK Combine Code of Corporate Governance 2006 “Levels of remuneration should 
be sufficient to attract, retain and motivate directors of the quality required to run the company successfully, but 
a company should avoid paying more than is necessary for this purpose. A significant proportion of executive 
directors’ remuneration should be structured so as to link rewards to corporate and individual performance”. 
4 CDR III recital 3; CDR Annex I, section 11, para 23   
5 https://www.db.com/ir/en/download/Deutsche_Bank_Compensation_Report_2018.pdf . This is s considerable 
drop from the figures reported before the reorganisation in 2016. For instance, in 2014 the Deutsche Bank 
reported 139 senior managers and 2,764 other MRTs (https://annualreport.deutsche-
bank.com/2014/ar/management-report/compensation-report/material-risk-takers.html)  
6 https://invest.bnpparibas.com/sites/default/files/documents/bnpp_2018_remuneration_report.pdf  
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 Remuneration directives, and the positions they apply to, have been structured through 
official directives issued by the European Parliament and the Council. The Capital 
Requirements Directive (CRD) III, published in November 2010, was the first milestone in the 
process and the gate through which Basel II was implemented within the EU. It is recognised 
that remuneration and risk taken by individuals and institutions must be linked. In the attempt 
to reduce risk taking, CRD III specifies that fixed and variable components of total 
remuneration have to be appropriately balanced and that the fixed component should represent 
a sufficiently high proportion of the total remuneration “to allow the operation of a fully 
flexible policy, on variable remuneration components, including the possibility to pay no 
variable remuneration component”.  However, setting the appropriate ratios between the fixed 
and the variable components of total remuneration was left to individual institutions for as long 
as: 
“a substantial portion, and in any event at least 50 %, of any variable remuneration 
shall consist of an appropriate balance of:  
(i) shares or equivalent ownership interests, subject to the legal structure of the 
credit institution concerned or share–linked instruments or equivalent non–cash 
instruments, in case of a non– listed credit institution, and  
(ii) where appropriate, other instruments within the meaning of Article 
66(1a)(a), that adequately reflect the credit quality of the credit institution as a 
going concern” (CRD III, Annex I). 
 
Although individual institutions were given a degree of flexibility to design their pay 
retention policies to align remuneration incentives with long–term interest of institutions, CRD 
III specified that “a substantial portion, and in any event at least 40%, of the variable 
remuneration component is deferred over a period which is not less than three to 5 years and is 
correctly aligned with the nature of the business, its risks and the activities of the member of 
staff in question” (CRD III, Annex I). Moreover, malus and clawback arrangements were 
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postulated when “subdued or negative financial performance of the credit institution occurs” 
(CRD III, Annex I). In the case of an employee leaving before reaching retirement or on his/her 
retirement, discretionary pension benefits would be deferred for five years. 
As CRD III was in the form of a directive, considerable differences occurred in how CRD 
III was interpreted and implemented by individual countries within the EU. Consequently, the 
implementation of the directives depended heavily on a country’s regulatory and supervisory 
bodies, their ability to identify and then accordingly adjust remuneration policies to correct for 
excessive risk taking.  
CRD IV was published in 2013 to reduce the differences in the implementation of CRD III, 
and to facilitate the implementation of Basel III. In contrast to CRD III, CRD IV was a set of 
regulations, not just a set of directives. Building on CRD III, CRD IV, introduced tighter rules 
for financial institutions, including rules on remuneration. 
  For instance, according to CRD IV the variable component should not exceed 100 per 
cent of the fixed component of the total remuneration for each employee, even though setting 
the exact ratios was still in the hands of individual institutions. Ratios lower than 100 per cent 
could be set by individual countries, but if the ratios were to be increased this required approval 
from shareholders or owners of the institutions. Furthermore, the higher ratio was capped at 
200 per cent.  
CRD IV maintained deferral requirements specified by CRD III, and added that “in the case 
of a variable remuneration component of a particularly high amount, at least 60 % of the 
amount shall be deferred” (Art. 94 (m)) and “up to 100 % of the total variable remuneration 
shall be subject to malus or clawback arrangements” (Art. 94 (n)).  
In the case of an early contract termination, the pay would “reflect performance achieved 
over time and do not reward failure or misconduct” (Art. 94 (h)). 
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Despite its regulatory nature and the more precise specification of rules, CRD IV was still 
open to different interpretations. Regulatory authorities in several individual countries issued 
separate documents that were designed to clarify the rules and help with their adoption (e.g. 
see FCA, 2016).7  Critical voices about the CRD IV remuneration rules have also been raised 
(e.g. see ESMA, 2016; Murphy 2013; Johnston, 2014). 
In December 2015, the European Banking Authority (EBA, 2015a) published a report on 
the prudential regulation of the investment industry. The report, prepared in collaboration with 
the European Securities and Market Authority (ESMA), provided an assessment of the existing 
prudential regulations and practices, and made recommendations for their improvement. 
Although remuneration is not the main focus of the report, it is noted that the proportionality 
aspects of the existing regulation require further thought and adjustment. They concluded that 
there has been insufficient differentiation among large, complex institutions and the smaller, 
less complex ones.  
In June 2016, the EBA launched a review of the effectiveness of CRD IV.8 The preliminary 
assessment of CRD IV and the proposed amendments was published in November 2016. The 
review showed that there were still considerable differences in the interpretation and 
application of CRD IV by individual countries. The review also showed that smaller and less 
complex financial institutions were negatively affected by some remuneration and deferral 
rules imposed by CRD IV, and that some of these rules were ‘not workable’ (EBA, 2016a).  In 
particular, in relation to deferral and pay in equity–linked compensation as specified in CRD 
IV, the report concluded that “the cost of applying these requirements exceeds their prudential 
 
7 In 2015, the  European Banking Authority issued their own guidance on remuneration practices  
https://eba.europa.eu/sites/default/documents/files/documents/10180/1314839/1b0f3f99-f913-461a-b3e9-
fa0064b1946b/EBA-GL-2015-
22%20Final%20report%20on%20Guidelines%20on%20Sound%20Remuneration%20Policies.pdf  
8 https://eba.europa.eu/regulation-and-policy/transparency-and-pillar-3/guidelines-on-disclosure-requirements-
under-part-eight-of-regulation-eu-  
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benefits in the case of staff with low levels of variable remuneration, since such levels of 
variable remuneration produce little or no incentive for staff to take excessive risk” (EBA, 
2016). 
The CRD V regulations were published in May 2019. They specify several amendments to 
CRD IV that will apply from 28 December 2020. CRD V softens some remuneration rules but 
tightens others. For instance, CRD V states that institutions with average asset value not 
exceeding €5 billion over the four–year period immediately preceding a given financial year 
are exempt from the application of payment in instruments, retention, and deferral specified in 
CRD IV.9 The exceptions also apply to employees whose annual variable remuneration does 
not exceed €50,000 or represent more than one third of their total annual remuneration.10  
While the reporting and remuneration setting regulations have been relaxed for smaller 
institutions, large institutions face a tightening of several regulatory rules. For instance, CRD 
V increases the minimum bound of the deferral period from three years to four for senior 
managers in big and complex financial institutions.   
 
2.1. Remuneration trends 
Remuneration in banks has been, and remains, at a high level even though its structure has 
changed and is in line with the Principles and Standards of Sound Compensation issued by the 
Financial Stability Board in 2011 (Cerasi et al., 2020).  The levels of banking remuneration 
appear to show low sensitivity to shocks (Axelson and Bond, 2015) and are higher than in other 
sectors even after controlling for differences in individual characteristics (Philippon and 
Reshef, 2012). Even though the 2008 financial crisis had tremendous impact on banks 
profitability and exposed numerous irregularities, Bell and Van Reenen (2014) show that in 
 
9 Individual countries can increase this threshold to €15 billion. 
10 Individual countries may not wish to apply the exemption. 
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2010, i.e. when many banks were still in ‘intensive care’, the  average compensation for 1,408 
of the UK senior bankers was £1,905,000.  According to Reuters, in 2015, four of the biggest 
European banks (HSBC, Deutsche Bank, Standard Chartered and Barclays) had 1,740 MRTs 
earning compensation packages in excess of €1 million.11 In the same year, according to the 
EBA, the number of high earners in banking across the EU reached 5,142.  In the UK alone 
3,567 bankers earned more than €1m each in 2017, and their combined earnings reached nearly 
€10 billion (EBA, 2019a).  Figure 1 illustrates how the number of bankers earning at least 
€1million a year changed since the introduction of CRD III (the pale blue bars, the left–hand 
axis), i.e. since the requirement to report remuneration of high earners was imposed. Between 
2010–2013 the numbers of high earners remained below 3,500. However, since 2014, the year 
CRD IV was introduced, the numbers of high earners have risen.  A big jump is clearly 
observed in 2015. The 2015 statistics are 33% higher than in 2014 and 61.8% higher than in 
2013.  Although the appreciation of the pound sterling against the Euro may have had some 
positive impact on the number of UK bankers (a significant proportion of EU high earners) 
with million–plus remuneration packages in these years, it is unlikely that the exchange rate 
change is the sole explanation of the increase in the number of high earners.12  
As the number of high earners increased, so too have the number of MRTs. Figure 1 shows 
that the increase in the number of staff recognised as MRTs increased from 1,875 in 2013 to 
3,350 in 2014 (or 78.7%), and to 4.408 in 2015 (a further 31.6%). In total, the number of MRTs 
increased by 135% between 2013 and 2015. 
The increase in the proportion of high earners being classified as MRTs is depicted by the 
(red) continuous line in Figure 1 (the right–hand axis). The big change in the ratio is clearly 
visible in 2014 when it jumps by 27.7% in comparison with 2013. The change in the ratio can 
 
11 https://www.marketscreener.com/BARCLAYS-PLC-9583556/news/Number-of-newly-minted-millionaires-
at-Europe-s-big-banks-is-shrinking-24101817/  
12 Pound sterling appreciated by 5 per cent between 31 December 2014 and the 31 December 2015, and 13 per 
cent between 31 December 2013 and 31 December 2015. 
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be at least partly attributed to the introduction of CRD IV, and that more high earners became 
classified as having material impact on the risk profile of the bank that employs them. Yet it is 
interesting that the tightening of the regulatory rules (defining who is and who is not an MRT) 
coincides with the increase in number of high earners. It could be fully expected that CRD IV 
would have a positive impact on the number of MRTs and the increase in the ratio of MRTs to 
high earners. However, it is less obvious why it would increase the number of high earners – 
unless the fact that being classified as an MRT pushes remuneration up.   
It would be interesting to know whether the introduction of CRD IV resulted in a change 
in the size and structure of remuneration of those who (i) were already classified as MRTs 
following the introduction of the CRD III, (ii) became MRTs  after the introduction of the CRD 
IV and (iii) have not been classified as MRTs before or after the introduction of CRD IV. 
 
 
Figure 1. The number of bankers earning at least €1million (high earners) a year, and the proportion  
of material risk takers (MRTs) among these high earners. 
 
Source: EBA annual reports on high earners (2014, 2015b, 2016b, 2019a) 
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Given that one of the aims of the regulatory changes was to achieve a reduction in the 
‘bonus culture’, it is important to look how the proportion of variable pay changed in 
comparison to fixed pay. Figure 2 shows that at the time of the introduction of CRD III, the 
average ratio of variable pay to fixed pay was two to one (the averages were taken across 
countries and across different job categories). This ratio has declined considerably over time 
following the introduction of CRD III in 2010 (compatible statistics for 2013 are not available), 
but variable pay remained larger than fixed pay until 2016. 2017 is the first year from which 
average variable pay has not exceeded fixed pay.  
 
Figure 2. Average ratio of variable to fix pay, 2010–2017. 
 
Source: EBA annual reports on high earners (2014, 2015b, 2016b, 2019a) 
 
 
However, taking averages across countries and across various jobs categories can be 
misleading. To complement the picture, Figure 3 shows the ratio of variable to fixed pay for 
the highest earning group in each country in 2017. It is not always the case that the highest 
earning group has the highest ratio of variable to fixed pay, but looking at the highest earning 
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group gives some indication of the scale of the ratio for those employees that are likely to be 
at the top of the executive ladder, and determining the risk taking profile of their institution. 
Figure 3 shows that in many countries (predominantly, the relatively smaller ones) the 
highest paid MRTs have variable pay that is lower than fixed pay. There is also a group of 
countries where variable pay is greater than fixed pay but does not exceed the ratio specified 
by CRD IV.  However, in France the highest paid person received nearly eight times as much 
in variable pay than they received as fixed remuneration in 2017. Interestingly, this is not the 
highest ratio in France. The two lower categories of high–earners had ratios of variable to fixed 
pay equal to 656% and 1,075% respectively.  The Belgian statistic is less dramatic, but still 
much higher than the regulatory upper limit of the variable to fixed pay. 
The highest ratio of variable to fixed pay for the highest–earning category is recorded for 
Norway. Since Norway is not part of the EU it does not have to adopt CRD IV; hence the high 
ratio does not break the EU remuneration regulations. 
 
Figure 3. The variable to fixed pay ratio (in per cent) as of 2017 for the highest pay category of MRTs per country. 
 
Source: EBA Report on High Earner (2019a) 
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3. Does executive remuneration affect risk taking? 
3.1. Characteristics and effectiveness of individual remuneration components 
There is a long–standing academic debate about whether remuneration, either in its form 
or size, impacts on performance. While the evidence that exists for non–financial firms on the 
links between remuneration and firm performance is mixed and reveals complex patterns, 
finding an answer in the case of financial institutions seems even more challenging. The 
assessment of financial performance is never complete if it does not account for associated 
risks. In the case of financial institutions (for convenience I will refer to them as banks), 
accounting for risk is particularly important. This is due to the potential difficulties in assessing 
a bank’s risks, and because the failure of a single bank may have systemic effects on the 
banking sector, and consequently the economy. Hence, in the case of banks, the debate on the 
existence of a remuneration–performance relationship has tended to focus on the relationship 
between remuneration and risk taking. 
The question of how executive pay affects risk taking lies at the heart of the discussion 
about bankers’ remuneration. Cheng et al. (2015) argue that the association between executive 
pay and risk taking arises because riskier firms have to pay higher remuneration than less risky 
firms to compensate risk–averse executives, not because higher remuneration induces higher 
risk taking. The argument that risk averse executives prefer to work for less risky firms (all else 
being equal), unless they are compensated for bearing the additional risk that is associated with 
working for a riskier firm seems logical and consistent with the basic risk–return relationship 
driving financial decisions.13 Yet when it comes to financial institutions, it is not entirely 
convincing that riskier banks (having higher betas, volatility and leverage) present greater risk 
for their executives. In fact, paradoxically, if banks are large enough then higher market or 
 
13 Grout and Zalewska (2012) show that, even when CEOs are risk–neutral, when special skills are needed and 
are rare, it may be optimal for shareholders to remunerate a CEO with many options, as high incentives are needed 
when high skills are needed.  This will result in highly–skilled CEOs’ remuneration being much larger than the 
remuneration fixed by the market for an average CEO. 
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operational risks may not be associated with the need for higher executive compensation. If 
banks are ‘too–big–to–fail’, explicit or implicit governmental guarantees reduce the risk that 
executives in non–financial firms would otherwise face. Furthermore, the argument that 
bankers may need incentives that are similar to other risk–averse investors may not be entirely 
correct.  Coats and Herbert (2008) and Stanton et al. (2011) document that higher levels of 
testosterone increase risk taking. Sapienza et al. (2009) show that the Chicago MBAs with the 
highest testosterone levels (and hence, the lowest risk aversion) selected careers in the financial 
sector. Thus, if banking executives are indeed less risk averse than other groups of executives, 
they may not need to be compensated more for taking higher risks. 
Regarding risk taking, it is important how executives are paid, not just how much. The 
composition of remuneration is not neutral with regard to risk taking. If remuneration structure 
aims to increase executives’ alignment with shareholders, then the remuneration package 
typically includes options and/or shares. Yet, even if executives hold shares in their own 
companies, it is unlikely that they maximise the same utility function when making decisions 
as their shareholders do. Differences in risk aversion between well–diversified shareholders 
and executives whose current income and reputation (hence, future income too) hinge on the 
companies’ performance are believed to result in sub–optimal decisions, from the shareholders’ 
perspective, and less risk taking than shareholders would prefer. Options are often introduced 
to executive remuneration packages to reduce the effect of executives’ risk–aversion while 
maintaining shareholder alignment. Options, given their asymmetric payoffs, reward good 
performance but do not penalise for poor performance. This asymmetry of payoffs causes the 
value of the options to increase with risk taken.  
Bonuses, another common remuneration component, may not be a direct reflection of 
share prices but, if their size and conditions of payment are linked to performance, they may 
induce risk taking. For instance, when performance is below the threshold that determines the 
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bonus payment, then the bonus provides an incentive to increase risk and therefore the 
probability of the bonus being paid.  
In the specific case of banks, where there is a material possibility that in times of distress 
a regulator or a government will step in and bail out a bank to avoid a bank run and financial 
instability, incentives to take more risk are even more pronounced. If a single bank becomes 
financially distressed, a regulator may let it fail to ‘teach others a lesson’. However, if all banks 
get financially distressed, a regulator has a little choice but to rescue them to protect the 
economy. This moral hazard problem further adds to the difficulty of structuring remuneration 
incentives, as no individual bank has an incentive to deviate from the rest.    
Many papers document that bank CEOs’ equity–based compensation (incentives designed 
to maximize shareholder value) tends to induce excessive risk taking. Bolton et al. (2015) show 
that when the chosen level of risk is not observable to bondholders, shareholders will always 
choose risk that is higher than optimal (assuming that the rational expectation equilibrium 
exists). There are plenty of studies that confirm the existence of a positive relationship between 
equity–linked compensation and risk taking (e.g. Balachandran et al., 2011; Adams, 2012; 
DeYoung et al., 2013; Gande and Kalpathy, 2017; Kolm et al., 2017; Boyallian and Ruiz–
Verdú, 2018; Sun, 2018; Kolasinski and Yang, 2018).  
However, it is not just equity–linked compensation and bonuses that are associated with 
higher levels of risk taking. Brown et al. (2015) document that severance pay is positively 
associated with risk–shifting, too. Brown et al. (2015) show that shareholders of financial firms 
that included severance pay in their CEOs’ remuneration packages experienced heavier losses 
in 1997–2007 than shareholders who did not grant such contracts, suggesting that severance 
pay may induce excessive risk taking.   
Excessive risk taking induced by CEOs’ equity incentives may be so severe that it results 
in insolvency (e.g. Gande and Kalpathy, 2017). Balachandran et. al. (2011) confirm that 
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equity–based compensation is associated with a higher probability of default, but they also find 
that cash bonuses decrease default probability.  This is in contrast to Hakenes and Schabel 
(2014) who argue that risk–shifting behaviour and bonus increases may be endogenous, i.e. 
bonuses grow with an increase in the probability of a bailout, but an increase in bailout leads 
to even more risk taking.  
In the search for optimal remuneration structures, from a stakeholder as well as a 
shareholder perspective, several theoretical models have been put forward. The main idea 
behind these models is to analyse how a reduction in the alignment of shareholders’ and 
managerial incentives affects risk taking, and how to achieve the reduction of this alignment. 
Eufinger and Gill (2017) argue that if banks remunerate in a ‘conservative’ way, i.e. they adopt 
a pay package that consists of a relatively high fixed payment and a relatively low 
performance–based wage component, then they should be allowed to take on more leverage as 
conservative remuneration structures are less likely to result in excessive risk taking. They take 
their argument one step further and argue that the form of remuneration structure should be 
taken into account in setting capital requirement, i.e. the more conservative remuneration 
structures are adopted, ‘the higher the leverage the bank is permitted to take on’.  
There are two issues with this conclusion. First, conservative remuneration structures 
can be a window–dressing policy that has little resemblance with the true risk profile of a bank. 
Second, the model does not analyse remuneration as a mix of a fixed salary and performance–
based reward. The conservative remuneration structure is a mix of a fixed bonus that would 
not be awarded in a bad state of the world (unless no risky projects were undertaken) and a 
variable component that depends on the type of project chosen and the state of the world. In 
contrast, the non–conservative remuneration structure consists of variable pay that depends on 
the type of the project chosen and the state of the world. Thus, the proposed remuneration is a 
mix of performance–based bonuses; one fixed in its size, and one directly linked to the return 
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on the project. Although such a remuneration structure is improbable in the real world (it can 
be safely assumed that some fixed salary will be expected to be paid regardless of the state of 
the world), the model shows that limiting the proportion of the remuneration that is return based 
(share–like component) reduces risk taking, or that risk taking incentives induced by bonuses 
are lower than risk taking incentives induced by holding equity.  
Bannier et al. (2013) constructed a model that illustrates a relationship between 
competition and bonuses. They argue that when competition for talent increases, bonuses 
increase, and consequently there is an increase in risk taking. The increase in risk taking can 
be so large that it will be value destroying for individual banks and even societies.  They argue 
in favour of reducing banking bonuses although point out that “any regulatory restrictions on 
compensation schemes would have to account for a multitude of different factors” which are 
not present in their theoretical model. 
Thanassoulis (2012) also analyses how restricting the size of variable pay impacts on 
risk taking. His model is based on remuneration being a mix of a fixed salary and a payment 
that is related to bank performance (which is a function of a bank’s size). By construction, the 
variable component resembles equity–linked compensation. Thanassoulis (2012) shows that 
restricting the variable pay (i.e. the equity–linked component) reduces risk taking. The results 
are therefore consistent with those of Eufinger and Gill (2017), and with empirical findings 
which show that restricting the manager–shareholder alignment reduces risk taking.  
Thanassoulis (2012) also argues that while capping performance–based remuneration 
has a negative impact on risk taking and a positive impact on performance, tough restrictions 
are value–destroying. This conclusion is expected, given that the ‘bonus’ variable in his model 
is a function of a bank’s size. He also stresses that the level of the cap is bank specific (the cap 
size depends on the bank size).     
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Thanassoulis and Tanaka (2018) focus their attention on explicit regulatory features, 
i.e. malus and clawback (M&C), and their effectiveness in reducing risk taking.14  Given  that 
the probability of triggering M&C increases with the risk of projects undertaken, it is expected 
that adoption of M&C will result in lower risk taking. However, as Thanassoulis and Tanaka 
(2018) notice, M&C are imperfect as they may lead to a rejection of high risk – high return 
projects that have high social value in favour of less socially beneficial but less risky 
alternatives. They also point out that the effectiveness of M&C in reducing risk depends on 
whether options are part of a remuneration package or not. In general, if executives are offered 
remuneration packages with high curvature of pay and M&C clauses, these M&C clauses may 
not result in lower risk taking. This again strengthens the argument against aligning 
shareholders’ interests with those of executives. Harris et al. (2017) conduct a lab study to 
better understand an impact of malus and bonus caps on risk taking. They confirm that non–
constrained rewards proportional to performance are most risk taking prone, yet differences 
between risk taking attitudes diminish when bonuses are conditional on hitting an absolute or 
relative performance target.15   
Inside debt is another ‘instrument’ that is argued to reduce risk–shifting behaviour in 
banks. Edmans and Liu (2011) argue that linking executive remuneration to inside debt (this is 
a general rather than bank specific argument) creates more efficient restrictions on risk–shifting 
than for example using bonuses. This is because, if executive remuneration is linked to inside 
debt, executives will be both concerned with the probability of bankruptcy and with the value 
of the assets in bankruptcy. In contrast, if bonuses are used as a risk–shifting prevention tool, 
the bankruptcy value of the firm does not matter because the bonus will not be paid when a 
 
14 Malus refers to an ex post claim on an unvested deferred pay, if there is evidence that a manager is responsible 
for poor risk management, misconduct, etc. Clawback, in contrast, is a claim on a bonus pay that has already 
vested. 
15 Ilić et al. (2019) document the use of relative performance evaluation in determining CEO pay in a sample of 
46 international banks.  
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firm goes bankrupt. Using a sample of U.S. banks, Bennett et al. (2015) found evidence 
consistent with Edmans and Liu (2011). They showed that a higher proportion of inside debt 
holdings by top executives was associated with lower risk taking and better performance during 
the 2008 financial crisis.  Similar conclusions were reached by van Bekkum (2016), and 
Kolasinski and Yang (2018).   
However, Thanassoulis and Tanaka (2018) argue that inside debt may be an inefficient 
mechanism of reducing risk–shifting when debt markets are informed. When the debt markets 
observe the risk of repayment of projects chosen by executives, they adjust their expected rate 
of repayment accordingly. This keeps the net present value of the executive compensation debt 
component constant, making it independent of the riskiness of executive’s project/risk choices. 
Thanassoulis and Tanaka (2018) argue that M&C rules and linking pay to interest rates may be 
more effective than using inside–debt.  Moreover, it is not clear whether Edmans and Liu’s 
(2011) arguments apply to banks that are too–big–to–fail because the probability of bankruptcy 
for such banks is not merely a function of executives’ risk choices. 
In the search for an effective composition of remuneration, Bolton et al. (2015) propose to 
include credit default swaps (CDSs) in executive compensation to reduce risk taking. They 
argue that including CDSs in executive remuneration contracts can provide first–best risk 
incentives, because the CDSs provide a market price for risk. In particular, they state ‘when 
banks’ performance deteriorates and their credit weakens (…), the banks [that have CDSs 
included in executive remuneration contracts] will be forced to conserve capital through the 
automatic adjustment of bonuses’.  Whilst it may be true that if CDSs were included in 
executive remuneration contracts, then they would have ‘create[d] a build–in stabilizer’ during 
the 2008 financial crisis. It is, however, not clear if they would have offered a mechanism that 
was strong enough to prevent it.  
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3.2.  Factors affecting remuneration 
The discussion of linkages between remuneration and risk–taking behaviour would not be 
complete if it did not take a wider view and attempted to look at factors that may be detrimental 
to shaping both risk taking and remuneration. Risk bearing is a fundamental characteristic of 
the banking business and is influenced by many factors that may also directly impact 
remuneration.   
The working of banks is closely related to how they are governed and regulated. When 
governance is determined, to an extent, by internal processes and structures, and is bank 
specific, then regulation defines an external ‘intervention’ that is designed to apply to all banks. 
Regulation in the post–crises era has become more prescriptive in imposing what is 
‘appropriate’ and what is ‘unacceptable’. Regulators set remuneration rules applying to banks’ 
executives, everyone deemed a material risk taker and/or those who have high enough 
remuneration. Regulation does not define individual remuneration packages and does not 
determine what strategic and investment decisions individual banks should make. These 
matters are left to boards and governance. 
  The importance of governance in shaping the soundness of the banking sector should not 
be underestimated.16 For instance, Onali et al. (2016) show that the structure of boards matters. 
They document that boards with greater monitoring powers increase bank performance, and 
that government ownership matters. In particular, the presence of government officials on 
boards is associated with lower payout ratios suggesting that the government, as a shareholder, 
represents broader stakeholder interests than those of minority shareholders. Słomka–
Gołębiowska and Urbanek (2016) show that concentrated ownership plays an important role in 
 
16 Fritz–Morgenthal et al. (2016) argue that risk taking culture is an important factor in explaining risk taking and 
that governance is one of the most significant factors in explaining stress test results. 
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determining executive remuneration, i.e. higher board independence is associated with lower 
executive compensation in banks with a controlling shareholder. 
Yet, paradoxically, while regulation aims to prevent possible governance failures, there are 
numerous examples where regulation may weaken governance rather than strengthen it. The 
Trouble Assets Relief Program (TARP) is one of the most studied examples of unsuccessful 
regulatory intervention. For instance, Winkelvoss et al. (2014) document that banks that 
received financial assistance within the TARP, lowered the CEO’s pay, and in particular, 
lowered bonuses and equity–based compensation (i.e. remuneration incentives commonly 
associated with risk taking). However, this does not infer that the intervention of the U.S. 
government at the start of the financial crisis resulted in lower risk taking by banks. Black and 
Hazelwood (2013) report that receiving TARP assistance resulted in greater risk taking by big 
recipient banks in comparison with banks that did not receive TARP cash injections. They 
argue that this was the result of banks receiving TARP bailout being “encouraged to make 
additional loans despite increased borrower risk”.  Duchin and Sosyura (2014) also argue that 
the TARP recipient banks initiated riskier loans, but they also document that the banks further 
increased the risk of their investments by shifting towards riskier securities. Duchin and 
Sosyura (2014) argue that because the shift in investments happened within the same asset 
classes, it remained undetected by regulatory capital ratios.    
TARP’s negative impact is not unique. Hryckiewicz (2014), using a sample of banks from 
23 countries, shows that regulatory interventions are associated with an increase in risk taking 
behaviour by banks.  She argues that this is a result of “the withdrawal of governance 
mechanisms in the post–intervention period, inefficient bank management and/or lack of 
appropriate restructuring process in the bailed–out banks.”  
Therefore, there is robust evidence that the ‘natural’ relationship between risk taking and 
risk–taking remuneration incentives can be distorted by governmental or regulatory 
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intervention. Moreover, governmental/regulatory interventions do not necessarily result in a 
reduction of risk taking, even if risk taking remuneration incentives have declined. 
 
4. Does remuneration of non–executive MRTs matter? 
While historically the literature has mainly focused on executive remuneration, the post 
financial crisis decade has delivered many papers that inform on issues that are much broader 
than those directly linked to boardrooms.  This is consistent with regulatory developments, and 
with the fact that regulation of the financial sector reaches far beyond bankers with executive 
powers.  
Although executive powers may be fundamental in setting strategic risk–taking decisions, 
it is well–understood that they do not have exclusivity when it comes to risk taking. Non–
executive MRTs play a fundamental role in how banks operate and perform. Therefore, it is 
important to understand the incentives that non–executive MRTs are subject to, and how 
responsive they are to these incentives. Just as the form of remuneration and its quantum sets 
risk taking incentives for executive, it should be expected that it will also impact on the risk–
taking behaviour of other individuals.  
It is well recognised that it is not just the executives in the financial sector who are 
highly remunerated (e.g.  Axelson and Bond, 2015; Philippon and Reshef, 2012;  Bell and Van 
Reenen, 2014). High levels of remuneration are associated with many factors, including 
demand for talent, competition, and general economic conditions (e.g.  Thanassoulis, 2012; 
Axelson and Bond, 2015; Acharya et al., 2016; Glode and Lowery, 2016; Célérier and Vallée 
2019).   
There is also ample evidence of a positive relationship between risk taking and 
remuneration structures. For instance, Cole et al. (2015) document a positive relationship 
between performance compensation and risk taking for loan officers at U.S. commercial banks. 
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Agarwal and Ben–David (2018) document that rewarding loan officers for originating loan 
volume led to a considerable increase in the amount of loans made and nearly a quarter increase 
in default rates, although formally there was no change in the observable characteristics of 
loans approved. Agarwal and Ben–David (2018) argue that loan officers incentivised to 
increase the number of loans overlooked important soft information about the quality of these 
loans.  Acharya et al. (2013) adds to the debate by showing that peer group performance 
incentives, not institutional incentives, are most to blame for higher risk taking in U.S. banks.  
Although the majority of papers on this topic are devoted to the U.S. banking sector, 
this should not be taken as an indication that risk taking behaviour induced remuneration is an 
American phenomenon. Efing et al. (2015) document the positive relationship between 
remuneration and risk taking in Austrian, German, and Swiss banks. Non–executive 
employees, who were the focus of the study, were rewarded by bonuses for their good 
performance. Efing et al. (2015) show that pay incentives correlate positively with both the 
level and volatility of trading profits.  To capture the ‘bonus culture’ of banks and to infer the 
causal relationship from incentives to risk taking, they use the ratios of average bonuses to total 
remuneration paid in segments of bank that are unrelated to the capital market activity as 
instruments.  
Axelson and Bond (2015) analyse the impact of moral hazard on remuneration and the 
effectiveness of remuneration in the financial sector. Given that moral hazard is particularly 
strong in the financial sector, and that working in the non–financial sector can be perceived as 
an available default option for financial sector workers in good economic times, then a 
combination of low effort and large bonuses within the financial sector can be seen as an 
equilibrium response to good economic conditions. Axelson and Bond (2015) conclude that 
such an equilibrium arises because financial sector workers face low consequences for reckless 
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behaviour when the economy and financial markets are doing well, since they may feel 
confident to “land on their feet” regardless of the outcome of their actions.  
Finally, Allen and Thompson (2019) ask the question why firms pay variable pay, 
making an important point that variable pay is not necessarily just an incentive. They argue 
that using variable pay may be endogenous to firms’ capital structures, with firms choosing 
more variable pay and leverage if workers face a low probability of job termination. They find 
support for their model using data on Canadian brokers and dealers.  
  
5. Shortcomings of the current research and potential development paths 
In short, the literature documents that there is a clear link between remuneration 
structures and risk–taking behaviour, that alignment of remuneration with shareholders’ 
interest results in higher risk taking, and that a reduction of this alignment reduces risk taking. 
Yet, we are still far from understanding and solving the issues that can arise from using 
remuneration as a mechanism to reduce risk taking.   
Striking the right balance between inducing an appropriate level of effort while 
restricting excessive risk taking is a difficult task. This is further magnified in the banking 
sector due to the sectors’ complexity, size, and its cross–border organisational and operational 
structures. In addition, the requirement to create a regulatory regime that will be simple enough 
to implement effectively yet rich enough to accommodate differences within and across 
institutions, as well as the specifics of individual countries, makes the undertaking particularly 
problematic. Moreover, the regulatory changes must target remuneration in a holistic way, i.e. 
affect its various components, as well as factors that stretch beyond remuneration.  
Narrowly focused regulatory changes can be easily offset. For instance, von Ehrlich 
and Radulescu (2017) show that the bonus tax introduced by the UK financial regulator in 2009 
had a significant impact on the structure of remuneration. As intended, the introduction of 
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bonus tax decreased the size of bonuses (by 40%). However, other remuneration components 
increased, resulting in no reduction in risk taking – the ultimate purpose of the regulatory 
change. 
The regulatory restrictions on remuneration introduced by CRD IV, i.e. restrictions on 
the size of variable bonuses, components of variable bonuses, and specifics of M&Cs, find at 
best only partial support in their effectiveness as tools to reduce risk taking behaviour from the 
academic literature.  While in theory the  CRD IV restrictions should be associated with some 
form of risk taking reduction, it is not clear at all that they have achieved what they were 
designed to do, nor that their side effects are not bigger than the benefits they have delivered 
(if any).  
There are only a handful of academic studies that assess the effectiveness of the CRD 
IV restrictions, and these seem quite narrowly focused. For instance, Kleymenova and Tuna 
(2016) argue that the introduction of the bonus cap in the EU was met with a negative market 
reaction.  
Although there are numerous studies discussing theoretical effects of capping bonuses 
and imposing M&Cs, they have limited relevance when trying to assess the contribution of the 
restrictions to any reduction in risk taking in the real world. This is because theoretical models 
use many simplifying assumptions in order to make them mathematically tractable, and as a 
result, tend to focus on specific aspects of the problem rather than provide a holistic assessment.  
One of the most obvious limitations of the existing studies is that they study remuneration 
issues separately from the perspective of executives or non–executive MRTs, not jointly.  
Although the remuneration/risk taking relationships faced by the two groups have some 
similarities, it is unlikely that they are identical. This is because the remuneration structures 
and the career incentives and opportunities of the two groups are very different, with younger 
and less experienced individuals being allocated higher risk tasks (e.g. Axelson and Bond, 
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2015). Cohn et al. (2017) also argue that more ‘senior’ positions are associated with lower risk– 
taking attitudes. Cohn et al. (2017) conclude that risk–taking behaviour is not induced by 
occupational norms in the banking industry; individuals with more salient professional 
identities are inclined to take less rather than more risk. Moreover, Cohn et al. (2014) show 
that raising someone’s occupational identity increases their propensity to cheat. Putting these 
two findings together, one could be tempted to draw the conclusion that individuals are more 
driven by the desire to achieve personal goals than to follow occupational norms. If so, 
establishing ethical norms and appropriate incentives may be even more important than is 
commonly recognised, suggesting more research in this direction is required.  
The existence of hierarchical structures limits the generality of some findings. To 
illustrate the issue let us return to Thanassoulis and Tanaka (2018). Applying M&C to bank 
employees, whether they are top executives or non–executives, may indeed impact on reducing 
their individual risk–taking appetites. However, it may also create unexpected side effects. If 
part of remuneration is to be ‘suspended’ for a few years and can only be received if an 
individual stays in their position when the M&C restriction expires, it may result in lower rank 
employees being excessively compliant to ensure that they stay in their job long enough to 
receive their remuneration.  In turn, this submissive behaviour of lower rank MRTs may result 
in excessive risk taking (especially if a higher proportion of remuneration is equity linked after 
the introduction of the CRD IV than it was before). Thus, M&C may have a positive impact on 
risk taking rather than reduce it.  
Hence, to better understand the impact of the remuneration directives, it is important to 
assess them as a ‘package’ rather than as individual rules. In particular, given that individuals 
respond differently to remuneration incentives depending on whether they are set in relation to 
the performance of their peers or not (Harris et al., 2017; DeYoung et al. 2019), it is important 
to study remuneration incentives in a group context. This is further highlighted by DeYoung et 
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al. (2019), who argue that a larger gap between a CEOs’ remuneration and the remuneration of 
their executive colleagues is associated with lower risk taking and better performance of U.S. 
banks. While the finding of lower risk taking may be a bit of a surprise, the evidence of the 
positive relationship between a pay gap and performance is consistent with the U.S. tournament 
literature in non–financial institutions (e.g. Kale et al., 2009; Rankin and Sayre, 2011).  
However, given that there is evidence that the positive pay gap and performance relationship 
is not universal (e.g. Ang et al. 1998; Zalewska, 2014), the question arises whether DeYoung 
et al. (2019) are a U.S. phenomenon, or whether they are universal, or in fact whether they are 
banking sector specific rather than national culture specific.  
Albuquerque et al.’s (2019) model indicates that this propensity to set peer–related 
remuneration to increase systemic risk is a banking–specific feature. They argue that 
shareholders are very effective in undoing regulatory intended effects designed to reduce risk 
taking. 
Another difficulty in assessing the impact of individual remuneration restrictions on 
risk–taking behaviour arises because restrictions on bonuses or M&Cs do not occur on their 
own. In real life, they are ‘married’ with other regulatory requirements. Therefore, to 
understand whether, and if so how, regulation of remuneration works, the effect of other 
regulatory requirements should be accounted for when assessing the impact of various 
structures of remuneration. This is however easier said than done. It would be nonetheless 
highly desirable to develop theoretical and empirical research that would fill this gap in the 
literature. 
In addition to these strands of the literature, there is also an urgent and growing need to 
push the remuneration research in the direction of trying to understand the impact of 
remuneration and its regulation on the development of fintech and sustainable finance/banking.  
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5.1. Fintech 
In addition to ‘traditional’ risks, a whole new range of risky practices and risk exposures 
have emerged in the last decade, which have neither been accounted for nor dealt with in the 
existing regulation. The technological innovations that are sweeping through the traditional 
banking industry are affecting how traditional services operate, which new services emerge, 
and unavoidably, the impact on risk taking behaviour and risk profiles.  
The development of peer–to–peer lending (P2P) around the world is a clear example of 
how lack of appropriate regulation can destabilise financial markets. China is a good example. 
China is typically thought of as having an interventionist political and economic system. 
Indeed, the traditional banking industry is under the tight scrutiny of the State Council of the 
People's Republic of China through its legislative arms of the People's Bank of China and of 
the China Banking Regulatory Commission up to 2018, and the China Banking and Insurance 
Regulatory Commission since 2018. In contrast to the tightly controlled banking sector, a 
practically unregulated P2P market emerged within just a few years, which at its peak in 2016 
amounted to $169.0 billion. In comparison, the two largest P2P markets in developed 
economies, the U.S. and the UK had $32.4 billion and $6.1 billion of assets respectively (Rau, 
2019). However, the lack of regulation that undoubtably contributed to the growth of the 
Chinese P2P market also led to its decline. It is unclear how many P2P platforms were Ponzi–
like schemes, and how many were created under an honest desire to provide funding and 
investment opportunities. Yet when public trust started to decline, many irregularities surfaced 
leading to a mass exodus of the schemes from the market.  
UK P2P platforms are better regulated, in comparison with China, as they fall under the 
regulation of the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA). It is however unclear whether existing 
regulation is appropriate for the needs and specifics of the P2P industry, and of the broader 
Fintech credit industry. One solution could be for P2P lenders to be regulated under ‘more 
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bank–like’ regulation, or to even become fully fledged banks and hence fall under full banking 
regulations. An example of the latter is Zopa in the UK. Zopa claims to be the oldest P2P lender 
in the world, and has recently become a bank in the UK, bringing it under the regulation of the 
Bank of England’s Prudential Regulation Authority.  
P2P lenders, and similar fintech companies, would likely face significant governance 
and remuneration problems if they were to become subject to more bank–like regulation, or 
full bank regulation. One such issue is dual class stock structures which are popular with tech 
companies around the world. An advantage of the dual class structure is that it allows the 
original entrepreneurs to retain control, whilst at the same time easing the path to bring in 
external funds to generate growth and to implement equity–based remuneration to incentivise 
non–founder management. However, one of the core features of banking regulation is the 
requirement to hold capital, which is typically based around common equity tiers (e.g. CET1). 
Introducing more bank–like regulation to the sector, or a lender choosing to register as a bank, 
may impose significant constraints on the business model of P2P and other fintech companies.  
Raising equity or paying equity–based remuneration to non–founders under a single equity 
class may appear more expensive to founders (reducing ability to grow), or at least may require 
a restructuring of the equity structure.  
A second issue is that banking regulation imposes restrictions on governance. For 
instance, the banking regulatory requirements for board appointments (designed to ensure a 
board has the ability to govern key functions) require that a bank’s senior responsibility map 
covers the prescribed responsibilities. An issue with many fintech companies their belief that 
the core risks affecting their ability to grow the business, as well as their business safety and 
soundness, are far more skewed to the technological aspects of the business. Hence, a primary 
concern of these companies is to ensure there is sufficient competence on the board to govern 
the technological issues.  It is claimed by these companies that the series of prescribed 
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responsibilities, and the board approval processes are overly focused on the traditional non–
fintech banking model.  Covering both the technological and financial requirements 
sufficiently would require the fintech companies to have overly large and unwieldly boards. 
Some fintech companies argue that they are faced with a problem of balancing core skills across 
board members and senior management, which in turn impinges on the balance of power, 
remuneration, and the level of risk in the business.  
A variant of this problem arises because of the training that non–executive board 
members are frequently requested to do to meet prudential requirements. This is particularly a 
problem for fintech companies because the non–executives that have sufficient free time to 
devote to these activities are typically those that have retired from an executive role. Given the 
pace of development of fintech, these people are usually older and have limited experience of 
fintech issues. Thus again, there is a potential disconnect between the board and the core 
concerns of the business. Disconnected boards may lead to inappropriate structure of 
remuneration incentives. If remuneration incentives are such that they do not reduce risk taking, 
there may be a greater need for other regulatory mechanisms to be more effective in reducing 
risk taking. There is, however, no guarantee that the existing regulatory tools are, or will be, 
strong enough to stabilise the banking sector when traditional banking is enhanced by fintech 
innovations.      
Eccles et al. (2020) shed some light on a potential issue regarding the effectiveness of 
capital requirements when some banks innovate and compete for depositors. If the market has 
some active depositors who take advantage of financial innovation (such as open banking) and 
search for better deposit opportunities than offered by ‘traditional’ banks, then some banks will 
innovate to attract these investors. However, competition for these active investors will raise 
the deposit rates offered to them, which in turn will incentivise the innovating banks to increase 
risk. As a result of losing depositors, some ‘traditional’ banks may respond by also switching 
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from their traditional role towards the innovative and competitive market, increasing their 
deposit rates and consequently taking more risk. Any increase in capital requirements imposed 
on these innovative and competitive banks will be passed through to depositors because of the 
competitive mechanism, and hence have less impact on risk taking of the competitive banks. 
Thus, although higher capital requirements have a ‘cooling down’ effect on risk taking in 
traditional banking, they may not have the same impact in the fintech world.  If the impact of 
capital requirements on risk taking weakens, this suggests that the role of other policies 
designed to reduce risk taking may have to enhanced, including the role of remuneration.  
 
5.2. Sustainable banking  
The impact of climate change risk has been studied in the finance literature from several 
perspectives, e.g. from the perspective of its impact on asset pricing and cost of capital (e.g. 
Balvers et al. 2017;  Donadelli et al., 2019; Hong et al., 2019; Karydas and Xepapadeas, 2019; 
Zerbib, 2019; Baldauf et al., 2020; Choi et al., 2020), changes in insurance risk (Collier et al, 
2009), asset allocation and strategies (e.g. Dessaint and Matray, 2017; Baker et al., 2018; 
Krueger et al. 2020), policies of central banks and stability of the financial sector as such (e.g. 
Batten et al. 2016, Nieto, 2017).  Yet, very little has been done to understand what drives the 
propensity to change and adopt new strategies, or new ways of investing in banks, and in 
particular whether the current structures of remuneration provide appropriate incentives to 
support green initiatives, decarbonisation, or other socially responsible initiatives.   
 So far there are powerful statements from many central banks which argue that the 
transformation to carbon–neutral economies is a must and should not be delayed. According to 
the Financial Times “Central Banks have a responsibility to make the financial institutions they 
supervise treat these [climate change related] risks as rigorously as any other” (Financial 
Times, “Central banks’ mandates allow them to tackle climate change”, 11 November 2019). 
 32 
 
Yet, there seems to be little evidence that individual banks have taken a lead in the process, or 
even follow the lead (e.g. Financial Times, “Banks fail to stop financing fossil fuel industry”, 
9 November 2019). JP Morgan Chase spent $63.9 billion on fossil fuel financing in 2018 alone, 
and $195.66 billion in 2016–2018.17  European banks do not have a great record either. Figure 
5 shows that fossil fuel financing does not appear to be a business in decline. The selected 
European banks spent a total of $497.8 billion supporting fossil fuel investments between 
2016–2018.  
 
 
Figure 5.  Annual spending on fossil fuel financing for selected European banks. 
 
Source: https://www.ran.org/bankingonclimatechange2019/#data-panel 
(RBS statistics for 2018 are not available) 
 
 
The EBA issued the “EBA action plan on sustainable finance” in December 2019, 
which outlines their “plans on deliverables and activities related to environmental, social, and 
governance (ESG) factors and ESG risk”. The document recognises that “executive 
remuneration, plays a fundamental role in ensuring the inclusion of social and environmental 
 
17 https://www.ran.org/bankingonclimatechange2019/#data-panel  
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considerations in the decision–making process” (EBA, 2019b; p. 4), but does not provide any 
indication what this may mean in practice. 
 We must ask – is it important to set ESG–benchmark compensation, and if so, how 
should this be done to induce the desired effects without also inducing undesirable side effects? 
How can we combine these ESG targets with risk taking restrictions?  
  The non–banking literature suggests that compensation that is linked to corporate social 
responsibility metrics enhances firm value (e.g. Maas, 2018, Ikram et al., 2019), and that 
objective metrics are more effective than subjective ones (Ikram et al., 2019).  It is also 
recognised in the literature that executives display a strong propensity to maintain the status 
quo rather than choose more value enhancing projects that require strategic change in 
organizations (e.g. McClelland et al., 2010). There is no reason to assume that these effects 
would be absent or reversed if tested on banking executives. It is however unclear who these 
‘angels of change’ might be, or how to get the best of them, given that risk taking in banking 
is not restricted to executives, that risk–aversion in a banking environment is negatively 
associated with rank, and given that the pressure to opt for more risky undertakings may be 
more bottom–to–top rather than top–to–bottom.  
Obviously, whether the implementation of new green policies or sticking to the old 
ways and networks (i.e. supporting fossil fuel investments) is the more risky strategy may well 
depend on the ability of bankers to detect, select and support the ‘right’ green initiatives.18 This, 
in turn may be a question of hands–on experience. However, in contrast to fintech (where many 
startups are run by young people with strong technical abilities), the attitudes of young bankers 
 
18 Islam and Zein (2020) show that in high–tech industry having a CEO who has investor skills and experience 
matters for the number and quality of patents as well as a greater innovation efficiency. Hands–on experience 
matters an inventor CEO’s superior ability to evaluate, select, and execute innovative investment projects related 
to their own hands–on experience. Extending this observation to green initiatives indicates that a considerable 
change will need to take place in running and governing the banking industry.  
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to green initiatives are more likely to be based on their personal preferences than on their prior 
experience (which is likely to be rather limited in this area). There is also a big difference 
between fintech initiatives and green initiatives, both in their size and consequence of failure. 
While it might be expected that many fintech unicorns will collapse, and that hardly any of 
them will be profitable, climate change initiatives cannot afford to go through a long and costly 
period of trials. Climate change needs to be tackled right now, and this needs to be done 
effectively and at reasonably low costs. That is, the banking sector needs to select and support 
projects that will make a true environmental difference as soon as possible, without 
endangering the stability of the banking system, at either individual country or global level. 
 Therefore, the following questions arise: (i) how to structure the remuneration of MRTs 
at different levels (not just of the executives) that will promote the change, (ii) how do these 
remuneration structures coexist with the desire to restrict risk taking, and (iii)  whether and 
how the current regulatory regime  would need to change to accommodate ESG objectives? 
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